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Abstract 
The land reform in Venezuela was introduced in 2001 and will according to its proponents 
decrease the country’s oil dependency through increasing agricultural production. The law 
also intends to decrease inequalities in the society by giving land to landless peasants. To 
achieve this, a land tax will be introduced on unproductive land and land can also be 
expropriated or repossessed by the state. The land reform has been criticised a lot and its 
opponents believe the reform will result in a major flight of capital as well as decreasing 
investments because of insecurity and consequently less agricultural production. 
The aim of this paper is to find out whether this land reform could be defensible from a socio-
economic perspective. To achieve the aim the starting point has been economic theories of 
how an agrarian reform could be conducted in an economically defensible way and focus has 
been on efficiency, investments and inequality. Further an interview study in Venezuela in the 
autumn of 2005 has been carried through. 
Does the Venezuelan land reform comply with the theoretical design? There are different 
opinions about this. Generally could be claimed that it does not comply with the traditional 
theories about efficiency, however, if the models are somewhat modified and under certain 
assumptions the reform might be defensible from an efficiency point of view. When it comes 
to investments it is uncertain whether they will increase because of secured property rights for 
the peasants or decrease because of the insecurity that large landowners experience. The final 
outcome will depend on how the law will be interpreted as well as to what extent the peasants 
will receive support. The reform will probably reduce inequalities in Venezuela, which could 
be favourable for the economy but this could also increase insecurity for investors. Further 
some practical problems might prevent a positive development. 
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Sammanfattning  
Jordreformen i Venezuela introducerades 2001 och ämnar enligt dess förespråkare att minska 
beroendet av olja, detta genom att öka jordbruksproduktionen. Den avser även att utjämna 
vissa av samhällets ojämlikheter genom att ge jord till jordlösa bönder samt att införa en skatt 
på jord för bönder som inte utnyttjar sin mark till fullo. En genomgång av landets 
jordegendomar och dess ägare är också en del av lagen och under vissa omständigheter kan 
jord exproprieras eller återtas av staten. Jordreformen har kommit att kritiserats mycket och 
motståndarna menar att denna lag istället kommer leda till kapitalflykt, mindre investeringar 
p.g.a. osäkerhet och därmed mindre produktion.  
Kan jordreformen anses försvarbar ur ett ekonomiskt perspektiv? Detta är frågeställningen i 
denna uppsats. För att studera detta har utgångspunkten varit teorier om ekonomiskt 
försvarbara modeller för jordreformer, med fokus på effektivitet, investering samt ojämlikhet. 
Dessutom har en fältstudie i Venezuela under hösten 2005 genomförts i form av en kvalitativ 
intervjustudie. 
Uppfyller då den venezolanska jordreformen den teoretiska modellen? Olika åsikter råder om 
detta men generellt kan hävdas att den inte uppfyller de traditionella effektivitetsteorierna. 
Vid viss modifiering av modellerna och under vissa omständigheter kan dock reformen anses 
försvarbar ur effektivitetssynpunkt. Huruvida investeringarna kommer att öka som ett resultat 
av reformen är osäkert. Säkrare äganderätt för småbönder kan medföra detta men motverkas 
av ett osäkrare klimat för storägare. Vilken kraft som slutligen blir den dominerande beror till 
stor del på hur lagen tolkas samt vilket stöd som kommer att finnas för dem som tilldelas jord. 
Reformen kommer troligen att verka utjämnande i samhället, vilket i vissa hänseenden kan 
vara gynnsamt för samhällsekonomin, samtidigt som detta kan öka osäkerheten för 
investerare. Eventuellt kan också vissa praktiska problem hindra en positiv utveckling. 
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Abbreviations and Translations 
I will with this chapter clarify some of the 
translations I use frequently throughout 
this paper. I will also explain some of the 
abbreviations I will use: 
Latifundia 
A large estate. 
Law of land and Agrarian Development 
Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo Agrario, 
introduced 2001. 
Law of Agrarian reform 
Ley de Reforma Agraria from 1960, valid 
until 2001. 
AD 
Accion Democrática. Political party. 
COPEI 
Comité de Organización Política Electoral 
Independiente. Political party. 
FNCEZ 
Frente Nacional Campesino Ezequiel 
Zamora. A peasant organization. 
 
IAN 
Instituto Agrario Nacional. Venezuelan 
National Agrarian Institute during the 
Agrarian reform law (Ley de Reforma 
Agraria), got replaced by INTi and two 
other institutes in connection with the 
introducion of ‘Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo 
Agrario’. 
INTi 
Instituto Nacional de Tierra. Venezuelan 
Nacional Land Institute.  
MAC 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria. Ministry 
of Agriculture and Breeding. Founded in 
1936, got replaced by MAT. 
MAT 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Tierra. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
MVR 
Movimiento quinta Republica. The fifth 
Republic’s Movement, the governing party 
of which Hugo Chavez is the leader.
 
Definitions 
The two terms ‘land reform’ and ‘agrarian reform’ are somewhat confusing and different 
authors give the two expressions different meanings. I would hereby like to clarify my use of 
terminology in this paper. 
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Most authors agree on that land reform is a part of an agrarian reform; it is the distribution of 
land for the benefit of landless workers, tenants and small farmers. Agrarian reform has a 
wider meaning and includes also a complement of measures such as education, agricultural 
credit, technical assistance, agricultural cooperatives etc.1 Kirby describes it as qualitative 
improvement of the land, increased agricultural productivity, and improvements in standards 
of living in the rural sector.2 
In Venezuela the term ‘reforma agraria’ is prevailing, which also was the name of the 
previous law. The present law is called ‘Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo Agrario’, Law of Land 
and Agrarian Development. Despite this I chose to call this paper ‘Agrarian reform in 
Venezuela’ since in article 306 in the Venezuelan constitution the State “should also stimulate 
the agricultural activity and the optimal use of the land by providing infrastructure, inputs, 
credits, further education and technical assistance.”3 
In the literature the term ‘land reform’ is used more frequently and sometimes as a straight 
alternative to ‘agrarian reform’.4 
                                                 
1
 King 1973, p. 2 
2
 Kirby 1992, p. 51 
3
 Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. Article 306. See appendix 1 for original text. 
4
 King 1977, p. 5 
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1 Introduction 
In an agricultural sense Venezuela is unique among its neighbours. Venezuela is a developing 
country but agricultural contribution to GNP is more comparable to industrialized nations and 
the amount of people working in the agricultural sector is far below nearby states. The reason 
for this is that oil was found in Venezuela in the beginning of the 20th century. This discovery 
changed the Venezuelan economy and transformed the country from a poor, backward 
agricultural nation into an industrial country and a consuming society. 
It is impossible to talk about anything in the Venezuelan society without mentioning the oil. 
Once the biggest exporter of oil in the world and later some steps down the ladder, oil has 
dominated Venezuela and its politics during almost a century. Because of the big revenues 
from oil and the tremendous growth in urban industry Venezuela shifted attention and 
resources from other areas and put its effort on oil export.5 
The agriculture is a sector that has suffered a lot from the oil strike. During the first decades 
of the 19th century, agricultural products were the backbone in the Venezuelan economy, now 
Venezuela imports about 70 per cent of its agricultural products and rapid growth in 
urbanisation has left the countryside unpopulated.  
Venezuela is as many other Latin American countries a very unequal society with a major 
poverty but also a small group of people with extreme wealth. This phenomenon is clearly 
seen in the agricultural sector where 70 per cent of the agricultural land is owned by 3 per 
cent of the population.6 Along with the urbanisation high unemployment has followed in the 
cities and once one of the riches countries on the continent the Venezuelans saw in the end of 
the previous century their economic fortunes decline in proportion to the fall in world oil 
prices. The fluctuations in the oil price and the fact that oil is a finite resource have reminded 
Venezuela of its dependency on this resource and its economic vulnerability.  
When the politically left oriented Hugo Chávez came into power in 1998, an agrarian reform 
was one of the first things he implemented. He visions less dependence on oil and a reduction 
of inequalities in the society but his opponents fear a Cuban influenced abolition of private 
property, where the State confiscates land from landowners. Sympathizers however argue that 
many nations for example the strong economies in Asia have successfully implemented 
agrarian reforms.  
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1.1 Problem background  
This paper is based on a minor field study performed in Venezuela in the autumn of 2005. 
The topic is the Law of Land and Agricultural Development, introduced by the government in 
2001. This law makes it possible for landless peasants to get land from the State and 
proprietors that fail to use more than a certain amount of land can be subject to an inactivity 
tax. Under certain circumstances private land can also be seized by the State. According to its 
proponents this agrarian reform is a way to raise agricultural production in the country and 
make them less dependent on other nations and therefore make the economy less vulnerable. 
They also claim that the reform will increase social justice through equalizing the ownership 
of land. Opponents however believe the reform will frighten away international enterprises. 
This will result in a major flight of capital because of decreasing investments and hence result 
in less agricultural production. 
1.2 Aim 
In the first chapter of the Law of Land and Agrarian Development it is stated that the value of 
the agrarian domain is not limited by beneficial economic effects in the national production 
but is a much more far-reaching human and social development.  Because of time constraints 
I have however delimited the work to a concentration of the economic part of the agrarian 
reform. More precisely; the aim of this study is to find out whether the agrarian reform in 
Venezuela could be defensible from a socio-economic perspective.  
1.3 Disposition 
To reach the aim the study will start out from economic theory about land reforms which will 
be studied to find out whether the theories are applicable in the Venezuelan case.  
The disposition of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter develops the method 
used as well as critics of selected sources. The section thereafter will treat the theoretical base 
for my study and explain the economic instruments used to reach the aim. In the fourth 
chapter the underlying background of the problem will become clearer and the readers will 
obtain a brief knowledge about Venezuela’s history, necessary to understand the land problem 
in the country. In chapter five the empirical study from the investigation in Venezuela in 2005 
                                                                                                                                                        
5
 King 1977, p. 148 
6
 In: Ellner et al, p 129 
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is presented and interviews made in Venezuela, make up a substantial part of the information. 
In the sixth section the material from the empirical and theoretical part is discussed and 
analysed and in the last chapter conclusions from the analysis are drawn. 
2 Method 
The Law of Land and Agricultural development has been debated frequently in Venezuela 
since the introduction in 2001. However, because of the novelty of the law not much has been 
written about the subject and large parts of the information used in this paper will therefore 
come from primary sources, mainly from interviews performed during the investigation in 
Venezuela 2005. Written material used comes mainly from reports published in Venezuela, 
the Law of Land and Agricultural development itself and the Venezuelan constitution. When 
it comes to more general questions about agrarian reforms material comes primarily from 
literature published outside the country such as publications from the World Bank as well as 
independent researchers within the domain. 
2.1 Interviews 
The investigation is conducted with a qualitative method and I have performed 16 individual 
interviews and one more informal interview with a group of 6 peasants, in Venezuela in the 
autumn of 2005. To understand the newly introduced law I have chosen to study it from three 
different angles and therefore the interviewees come from three different areas in the society.  
The first group was the peasants, or their spokespersons, whose perspective was essential to 
understand many fundamental questions. Further the landlords, or their representatives, were 
a very important counterbalance to understand the whole problem. The third perspective was 
the view of the professionals. The persons interviewed in the third group hold very different 
views in the question and represented are, among others, lawyers and investigators for and 
against the land law, as well as persons representing the government. 
The interviews are conducted both in urban and rural areas and the questions used were 
individual depending on the person’s position and knowledge. All interviews but two are 
recorded with a tape recorder, why the two fell out was due to limitations in the technical 
equipment. The length of the interviews varies from 30 minutes to 3 hours. 
  
4 
 
 
Since this topic is quite delicate in Venezuela I have chosen to keep some of the persons 
interviewed anonymous and they will therefore just be described in the reference list. 
2.2 Source criticism 
The Venezuelans are deeply polarized over the politics of their president Hugo Chávez and 
this phenomenon influences all levels of the society from media to the universities. 
Unfortunately the objectivity has been seriously harmed by this fact and the truth is difficult 
to determine. The lack of access to statistical data and the possibility that existing material 
may be manipulated or very biased sometimes made my investigation difficult. This, together 
with the novelty of the law, which makes an evaluation of the economic effects difficult, 
made the analysis more focused on the possibility if the Agrarian Reform theoretically could 
be economically defensible and not if it really, in practice, is economically favourable.  
3 The economics of agrarian reform  
Could an agrarian reform be defensible from an economic perspective? The classical theory 
argues the market will solve any problems arising if it is left without interference. However 
many researchers on land policies agree that an agrarian reform could be defensible if it is 
performed properly. 
I will in this chapter give an insight in the economic theory of how an agrarian reform could 
be conducted in an economically defensible way. Efficiency and investments are two relevant 
economic questions but also inequality and I will analyse these theories to be able to compare 
with the facts about the agrarian reform in Venezuela. 
The definition of agrarian reform differs among the authors, as I explained while defining the 
concept above. In general it is however possible to describe it as “a process that involves 
fundamental changes in the patterns of land ownership and use, resulting in significant 
transfers of wealth, income and power from the landowning elite to the peasantry”.7 Hence it 
is a reallocation of resources.  
                                                 
 
7
 Kirby 1992, p. 56 
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3.1 Efficiency 
3.1.1 Economic concepts 
Pareto efficiency means that an allocation of resources is efficient if it is not possible to make 
one person better off without making at least one other person worse off, something rather 
hard to achieve in reality. A weakening of the Pareto model is Kaldor-Hicks’ compensation 
test, which says an allocation of resources is superior to another if the winner can compensate 
the loser and still be better off.8 Set in an agricultural context a land reform, where land is 
taken from landlords, can never be efficient from a Pareto-optimal point of view since the 
landlord loses land and will therefore be worse off. For a land reform to pass the Kaldor-
Hicks’ compensation test, the reform has to be designed so that the peasants are responsible 
for the compensation to the landlords – or at least hypothetically could manage to be 
responsible, no real transaction has to occur to make it pass the test - but still after the 
compensation are better off than before.  
Many authors9 criticise these models which include a benefit that grows linearly with 
increasing wealth as shown in figure 1. The opponents argue for a model of diminishing 
marginal utility of income, i.e. a model that takes into account that increased wealth by for 
example one unit might increase benefit by less than one unit, shown in figure 2. This applied 
on a land reform could mean that the poor peasants value the land higher than the wealthy 
landowner because the land for the poor is a commodity in short supply, seen on the steep 
slope in the first part of fig. 2. To exemplify an extreme case the transfer of land has signified 
that the wealthy landowner has lost some land, but will hardly notice the loss, while the 
former landless has received land, which makes it possible for him/her to survive and the 
benefit for the society as a whole is therefore positive.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Perman et al, p. 107, 113 
9
 See for example Johansson, p. 33f 
Figure 2 
Shows the foundation of diminishing 
marginal utility with a diminishing growth 
between wealth and utility. 
 
Figure 1 
Shows the foundation of the Pareto and the 
Kaldor-Hicks model with a linear growth 
between wealth and utility. 
 
Wealth 
Utility Utility 
Wealth 
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Consumption   
 
 
 
    
  A 
Subs.     B 
  
Income 
effect     C 
         
 
 
   
   Hours of leisure 
Substitution effect         
 
 Income effect 
3.1.2 Land Taxation 
When externalities are present, the need for governmental intervention could be very strong. It 
is difficult for an individual to take into account the positive or negative effect of their action 
when deciding what levels of services that should be produced or consumed. The positive or 
negative effect the action has on the society is thus not included when the levels are set out, 
because the individual does not have anything to gain on regulating it. Therefore, often in the 
case of positive externalities too little of the service is produced and too much when it comes 
to negative externalities.10  
One problem most agrarian reforms are set out to prevent is unproductivity. If the society 
considers high production as something preferable, this is seen as a positive external effect of 
the landowner’s action and could be encouraged by a subsidy. The problem could also be 
remedied by a tax on unproductivity. 
Taxes are generally associated with harmful effects such as distortions and dead weight 
losses. When someone is subject to a tax this changes the slope of the budget constraint and 
makes consumption more expensive relative the hours of leisure, see figure 3. This change 
will result in two different outcomes. One effect is substitution (A-B), i.e the person 
substitutes leisure for consumption since this comodity has becomen less expensive relative  
 
                                                                          
to determine which one will be the 
dominating.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Income and substitution effect. 
                                                 
10
 Petit, Michel. In: Umali-Deininger 1994, p. 447 
consumption. The other outcome is the income 
effect (B-C), i.e. when the person choses to 
work more to compensate the loss of money 
that is the result of the tax. The income and the 
substitution effect act in the opposite direction 
when it comes to hours of leisure and it is 
difficult to determine which one will be the 
dominating and hence if hours of leisure will 
increase or decrease. 
When it comes to land taxes the influences on 
the landowner are somewhat different and 
many authors agree that a land tax could be an 
efficient way to conduct a land reform. 
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A land tax would change the landowner’s budget constraint inwards and therefore not result 
in a substitution effect as seen in figure 4. For a farmer with agricultural production as the 
only source of income a tax on land might encourage the owner to produce more agricultural 
products in order to keep the same standard as before. 11 If the tax is progressive and benefits 
landowners with high production, i.e. farmers that work more, consumption has relatively 
becomen less expensive and the substitution effect and the income effect work in the same 
direction, as seen in figure 5. This will clearly induce owners to either intensify their 
cultivation or to abandon parts of their holdings.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When it comes to general taxes on for example sales (VAT) the only way a taxpayer can 
respond to an imposition, provided the same income, is to purchase less goods. This could 
harm the economy since the system involves dead weight losses and decreases quantity 
demanded, see fig. 6. 13 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Bird 1974, p. 182 
12
 See for ex. Deininger 2003, p. 165 and King 1977, p. 18 
13
 See for ex. Johansson, p. 93 
Consumption 
 
   
C
 
  
           BC 1 
  
 BC 2  
   Hours 
       of leisure
  
 
 
Consumption 
      
 
 
B 
 
                C             A 
 
 
 
 
 Hours 
. of leisure 
 
               Substitution effect 
  
            Income effect 
Figure 4.  The tax on land makes the initial budget 
constraint (BC 1) shift inwards to BC 2 because the tax 
decreases the amount of money available for the farmer. In 
order to keep up with the same consumption (C) the farmer 
has to sacrifice more hours of leisure and hence produce 
more.  
Figure 5. With a progressive land tax the 
substitution (A-B) and income (B-C) effect work in 
the same direction and stimulate hence production. 
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Land is though a limited good i.e the elasticity of supply is zero and a higher price through a 
tax does not alter the quantity, as seen in fig. 7. The only way a proprietor can respond to a 
tax on land, if not willing to pay it, is through relocation, i.e. to sell off the land. A tax on land 
will therefore not give any dead weight losses and hence be less distortionary than taxes on 
for example sales or income. 14 
To be able to administrate a land tax equitably and effectively, i.e. to minimize distortion and 
deadweight losses, a cadastre or an official record is fundamental to be able to identify all 
taxable properties. A large investment is needed to come up with a satisfactory cadastre and 
the record should at least contain location, size, value and ownership of the properties, but 
also its productivity capacity.15 Lack of knowledge about the capacity might lead to an unjust 
taxation system between landowners with high and low quality land, since they will have 
different possibilities to produce and to generate income. Literature has shown that this effect 
might be large enough to make a land tax less attractive than an output tax.16  
Taxes can be based on different bases like area occupied or on property value. To reach 
minimal effects of disincentives and to minimize distortionary effects the land tax should be 
based on potential monetary yield from the plot under normal conditions or can be levied on 
the value of unimproved land, i.e. land without cultivation. These ways of taxing land would 
be less distortionary because it does not disencourage the farmer to cultivate the land, which 
                                                 
14
 Deininger 2003, p. 165 
15
 Bird 1974, p. 226f 
16
 Deininger 2003, p. 167 
 Cost / unit Cost / unit 
  Supply + tax 
  Supply 
 Supply 
  
  
  Dead weight loss 
 
  
Tax Tax 
 Demand Demand 
 
 Quantity Quantity of land 
   
 Figure 7. Supply of land is inelastic and a 
tax does not alter the demand for land or 
implies dead weigth losses. 
 
Figure 6. Taxes in the case of a linear 
supply curve changes the units of 
quantity demanded. 
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could be the result if levied on for example property value.17 As seen in figure 8, 18 the tax on 
potential monetary yield works as a punishment for idle land and an incentive 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
be excluded from the tax, partly because of the high administrative cost it would cause, but 
also because of the high risk of disadvantage for poor because of imperfect or unavailable 
insurance markets.19 For example a bad harvest for a poor peasant could result in the loss of 
the property because of bad liquidity. 
3.1.3 Farm size 
Another central question when it comes to land policy is whether the size of the farm has 
anything to do with the production efficiency. According to the World Bank’s Land Reform 
Policy Paper from 1975, it has a connection and small or medium farms proportionally often 
have higher yields and probably higher total factor productivity, i.e. contribution to output of 
everything except labour and capital, than large farms that operate with hired labour. 
Binswanger et al claim that compelling empirical evidence has later proved this, as well as 
that small farms use more labour and less capital per hectare cultivated than large farms, 
which could provide employment. 20  
The advantage of the large farm is on the one hand that they usually have better access to 
credit; the disadvantage on the other hand is that they need to supervise their hired workers. 
According to Binswanger et al empirical data rarely show any evidence of economies of scale 
transcending the size of farm that can be operated by a family, which would mean that the 
                                                 
17
 Deininger 2003, p. 165-166 
18
 Bird 1974, p. 182 
19
 Deininger 2003, p. 168 
20
 In: Umali-Deininger, p. 198 
Fixed tax rate 
Income from land 
Output 
A raise in output above the 
presumptive income means 
lower tax rate / output 
A low out-
put means 
a high tax 
rate/output 
for unproductive farmers 
to produce more, until the 
return of land equals the 
presumptive income. A 
production above the 
potential generates relativ-
ely a lower taxrate/output. 
Owners with extremely 
small holdings should also  
Presumptive 
income 
 
Figure 8. Interpreted by the author from Bird 1974, p. 182. The 
farmer with a low output is encouraged to produce so the income 
equals the presumptive income. 
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supervision cost advantage of small farms usually exceeds the credit cost advantage of large 
farms. 21 These findings can though be debated since big farms in some cases can have big 
advantages over small farms. Binswanger et al mention for example products such as 
bananas, tea and sugar that require harvest and proceeding closely coordinated.  
When it comes to distribution of land, most reforms that in the past have shown a positive 
impact on productivity have had a previous system that mostly contained small peasant farms, 
with a high rate of insecure tenancy and absentee landlords. If a reform breaks up large 
efficient and modern farms to substitute with small producers who know little about modern 
techniques the impact often, with a few exceptions, is devastating for the productivity and the 
efficiency. 22  
3.2 Investments 
“Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn it into a garden; give him 
a nine years' lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert.” 
 
The English agriculturalist Arthur Young 1792 
 
From an economic point of view it is relevant to analyse the economic climate in the area 
studied to distinguish whether it is a favourable environment for investments or not. Here 
property rights are an important issue. A property right could be defined as “a bundle of 
characteristics that convey certain powers to the owner of the right”. This concerns for 
example conditions of appropriability of returns. 23 A distribution of land through a land 
reform should result in improved property rights for landless. According to Carter et al 
normally two effects of secured property rights are hypothesized. One could be called the 
security-induced investment demand effect, i.e. an investment increase because of the 
reduction in the likeliness of losing the land. If land is given to landless peasants through a 
land reform they will hence have incentives to work the land efficiently since they are the 
ones that are going to receive the benefit of their work. The other effect is a collateral-based 
credit supply effect, which is when lenders become more willing to make loans when they are 
assured that land as collateral is secure.24  
Petit draws it further and states that “if the policy and institutional framework is adequate, 
allocating individual property rights to land provides a powerful tool to create gainful 
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 In: Umali-Deininger, p. 198 
22
 Perkins et al, 2001, p. 592 
23
 Perman  et al, p. 124 
24
 Carter et al, p. 173 
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employment, reduce poverty and improve the nutritional status of the poor, and increase 
output and efficiency.”25 
3.3 Inequality 
”Latin American countries have one foot high up on the ladder and the other so low that they 
cannot climb” 26 
Whether or not the reallocation of resources through an agrarian reform reduces inequality in 
the society, depends on how the distribution occurs. If the landless is required to pay the 
landlord the full market value of the land received, the wealth distribution for the society is 
the same as before. If there is no compensation the reform will have a major impact on 
distribution of income and might reduce inequalities between rich and poor.27 It is hence of 
interest to touch the issue of equality to see whether it is a positive or negative phenomenon 
for the economy.  
The opinions differ a lot in this area. A summary of the classical model, launched by the 
Nobel prizewinner Arthur Lewis, is according to Perkins et al “grow first, then redistribute.”28 
de Ferranti et al nevertheless claim that later studies have shown that countries with more 
unequal land distribution tend to show lower rates of economic growth. This, among other 
things, because of the possibility to miss highly profitable investments as a result of unequal 
credit access, as well as losing possible contribution to society because of unequal 
education.29 Johansson is of a similar opinion and argues “a reallocation from a higher income 
person to a lower income person yields a utility gain to the lower income person that exceeds 
the loss to the higher”.30 This gives evidence of a diminishing benefit function in the same 
line of argument as in figure 2 in the beginning of this chapter. Perkins et al however are of 
the opinion that it has to do with the management. If an asset, for example a farm that has 
been expropriated, is less productive under the new management then some or all of the 
redistributed effect is wasted.31 A distribution of land has resulted in that resources get in the 
hands of people that are less willing to pay for them and would then be a socio-economic 
degradation.  
                                                 
25
 In: Umali-Deininger et al, 1994, p. 451 
26
 King 1977, p. 70 
27
 Perkins et al 2001, p. 592 
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 Perkins et al 2001, summarize the work of A. Lewis, p. 141 
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 de Ferranti et al, 2004, p. 4 
30
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income 
Consumption 
Figure 9 
Interpreted by author 
King describes a different view and states that income redistribution through land distribution 
can result in that the poor gets a little extra income which can have a significant impact on de- 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Background on Venezuela and the reform 
Venezuela’s agrarian history is essential to know to understand the agrarian politics of today, 
but other things in the Venezuelan history are also important to know to grasp the problems 
that Venezuela is facing today. The following chapter will therefore give a brief introduction 
to the history of Venezuela in the 20th century as well as prevailing facts. 
4.1 Modern history of Venezuela 
4.1.1 Oil and its effects 
Oil was found around 1910 in the area of Maracaibo in the north-western parts of Venezuela. 
Then the backbone of the economy was coffee and cacao but in the end of the 1920s, 
Venezuela already was the biggest exporter of oil in the world. In 1920, Venezuela’s exports 
constituted 96 per cent of agricultural products, coffee and cacao alone made up 80 per cent of 
the export. 45 years later it had decreased to 1.5 per cent and at the same time the export of oil 
amounted to 91 per cent.32 Today only 4 per cent of the country’s territory is under 
cultivation, although much larger areas are said to be potentially cultivable.33 
One major influence the oil strike had on the Venezuelan economy was the so-called Dutch 
Disease. This economic phenomenon occurs when the discovery of a natural resource raises 
the value of that nation's currency, making manufactured goods less competitive with other 
nations, increasing imports and decreasing exports. This trend became more than evident in 
                                                 
32
 www.ne.se, Venezuela, historia. 
33
 King 1977, p. 147 
mand, and hence the whole economy, especially when 
it is combined with the security that their efforts can 
yield them more in the future.1 This would however 
presuppose that the demand curve for consumption is 
steep on low income levels but diminishing on high 
levels, as shown in figure 9. 
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the case of agriculture and although statistics vary quite a bit, Venezuela is today importing 
more than 50 per cent,34 some argue as much as 70 per cent,35 of its agricultural products. 
The changes in the economy and in the production in Venezuela created a massive 
urbanisation in a short period of time. In 1921, 15 per cent lived in urban areas but in 1961 the 
population in the cities had grown to 67 per cent.36  
Today about 14 per cent of the population works in the agricultural area37 and agricultural 
products contributes to only a few per cent of the Venezuelan GDP. For comparison it can be 
mentioned that the neighbouring countries Colombia and Brazil have an agricultural 
contribution to GDP with 14 and 8 per cent respectively.38 
Most of the land in Venezuela is covered by forest and the country has massive rainforests in 
the south to a great extent protected by national parks. Simplified, the centre of the country, 
called los llanos, is dominated by cattle farms and in the western parts the mountain chain of 
the Andes and the lake of Maracaibo make up a great part of the land. 
Forest
Arable land
Other
Cropland
Pasture
  
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Land (MAT) the State today owns 18 million 
hectares of the land while private owners hold 25 million hectares.39  
4.1.2 Venezuela’s political history 
Venezuela was a dictatorship until the end of the 1950s. There had in the past been some 
attempts to create democracy but it was not until 1958 democratic forces could take the 
power. During the following 40 years two parties, AD and COPEI, ideologically not far from 
each other, alternately governed Venezuela. Throughout a long period of time Venezuela 
                                                 
34
 Machado, professor at IESA and Mora, wx President of IAN, personal messages 
35
 Molina, MAT, personal message 
36
 Delahaye 2001, p. 76 
37
 Delahaye 2002, p. 351 
38
 Nationalencyklopedin [homepage], Venezuela, Brasilien & Colombia, Jordbruk  
39
 Molina, MAT, personal message 
As seen in the diagram, forest covers 56 per 
cent of the Venezuelan land area, arable land 
and cropland together make up 4 per cent and 
pasture covers 21 per cent. 
Figure 9. Land use (% of total) in 2000. Source: World Bank Environment at a Glance 2004, Venezuela 
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could enjoy big revenues from high oil prices and the State expanded. When prices however 
declined the government had to borrow to sustain its expenditures which resulted in an 
economic and political crisis at the end of the 1980s. The chaos that followed made people 
lose confidence in the present government, which paved the way for Hugo Chávez and his 
party MVR. Chávez’s promises of radical changes in the society appealed to many voters and 
in the election in 1998 he broke Venezuela’s political pattern and became the president of the 
country. His change of the constitution in 1999 as well as the new laws introduced in 2001 
has polarized the population politically and protests against him as well as major strikes have 
several times resulted in severe economic crises.  
4.2 History of agrarian reforms 
Land has for a long time been a big issue in whole Latin America. Most countries have 
performed or tried to perform land reforms in order to change the prevailing system. Ezequiel 
Zamora was a Venezuelan general and leader in the mid 19th century who fought for peasants’ 
rights. He encouraged war against the oligarchy and wanted distribution of land to the 
peasants and has therefore become a symbol for peasants throughout Venezuela.  
The first agrarian reform in modern time in Venezuela was the Law of Agrarian Reform in 
1960. In 1945 and 1948 there had been attempts to create one, but a coup d'état in 1948 
stopped this and it was not brought up again until after the dictatorship, which lasted until 
1958.40 
The Agrarian Reform of 1960 intended to work for “the transformation of the agrarian 
structure of the country and the incorporation of its rural population towards, economic, social 
and political development of the nation, through the substitution of the latifundian system for 
a fair system of property, possession and exploitation of land, based on equal distribution of 
land, an adequate credit organization and a far-reaching assistance for the producers in the 
countryside.” 41 
The law of Agrarian Reform was used during 41 years and the opinions about its 
appropriateness differ a lot. However, a general judgement is that the law as time went on got 
rather paralysed, but the discussion about this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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4.3 The Law of Land and Agrarian Development 
Mission Zamora 
Bolivarian Revolution, sovereignty and secured food supply. 
Fight against the latifundian system! 
Honour the peasant! 42 
The Land Law, also called Plan or Mission Zamora after Ezequiel Zamora, was introduced in 
November 2001 and substituted therefore the Agrarian Reform law from 1960. 
4.3.1 The Constitution 
The constitution from 1999 contains the foundation of the land of law and it is declared that 
“the State should promote the conditions of a far-reaching rural development, with the 
purpose to generate employment and to guarantee the peasant population an adequate level of 
well-being.”43 The constitution further states that it is elementary to guarantee food security 
and food production is of national interest, fundamental for the economic and social 
development of the nation.44 
4.3.2 Head actors 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Land (MAT) has the general responsibility for the agrarian 
development in Venezuela. In connection to the Ministry three autonomous authorities were 
created to replace IAN when promulgating the new law; the National Land Institute (INTi), 
The Venezuelan Agrarian Corporation (Corporación Venezulana Agraria) and the National 
Institute of Rural Development (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo). INTi has the executive 
power45 and is in charge of the regulation of agricultural land, the declaration of idle land, the 
certification process, as well as to handle expropriation and return agricultural land that 
belongs to the State. The Venezuelan Agrarian Corporation has the task to develop, 
coordinate and supervise the entrepreneurial activities of the State for the development of the 
rural sector. The National Institute of Rural Development is to contribute with far-reaching 
rural development of the agrarian sector when it comes to infrastructure and education.46 
This section has given a short introduction of the Law of Land by describing the overriding 
facts, but more information is needed in order to understand the economic perspective and in 
chapter five the agrarian reform will be discussed more deeply. 
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 INTi, [homepage] 2006-02-27 
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 Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. Article 306. See appendix 3 for original text. 
44
 Ibid. Article 305. 
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5 The empirical study 
In this chapter I make substantial use of the 17 interviews with landowners, peasants and 
professionals during the investigation period in Venezuela. For more information and 
background on the persons interviewed, see the reference list, personal messages. 
In the following text the Law of Land and Agricultural Development is described more in 
detail to make a comparison possible between the theoretical facts and this law. The first 
section is a description of the changes in ownership that the Law of Land induces, which 
includes smaller holdings where the peasants cooperate. Further follows a description how the 
soil is classified according to the new law and the section thereafter describes the inactivity 
taxation of land that will be introduced in 2007. The two final elements of this chapter contain 
the process of application for landowners and peasants as well as the distribution process of 
land to the peasants. 
5.1 Change in ownership  
5.1.1 Latifundia 
The definition of this originally Spanish word is a large estate, but the latifundian system is 
often characterized by a great concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few people. 
According to the Law of Land and Agrarian Development, a property is latifundia if it is idle 
and larger than the average size of land located in the same region. Idle is determined when 
the land indicates a yield of less than 80 per cent of the suitable yield.47 The suitable yield is 
calculated through a complex set of rules according to Título III in the law. 
Many professionals within the area have criticized these definitions and Román Duque48, Dr 
in Law, questions the ambiguities about what average occupation and suitable yield is. He 
claims that the lack of clear definitions makes the denotation of latifundia dependent on 
interpretations of each case which will result in a great insecurity for the landowners.  
Most of the persons interviewed agreed that there is a problem with latifundias in Venezuela, 
but they varied considerably in their opinions about how serious the problem is. According to 
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 Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo Agrario, p. 8 
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Guido Molina49 at the Ministry of Agriculture, about 600 families own 25% of the 
Venezuelan territory which he assures makes it impossible to develop a country. Professor 
Carlos Machado50 though asserts that there is no demand for land in Venezuela and hence 
latifundias are not a problem. Further he continues not all latifundias are unfavourable for a 
country and he exemplifies Mexico and the USA as examples where great farms are highly 
efficient and generate much employment. 
The biggest latifundia in Venezuela according to INTi, is La Vergareña in the State of Bolívar 
with a size of 200 000 hectares.51 
5.1.2 Idle land 
Since most of the persons interviewed, both proponents and opponents of the law, considered 
latifundias to be a problem in Venezuela, it is of interest to discuss why people own land they 
do not cultivate. One argument brought forward is that in countries with instable economy for 
example high inflation, people want to maintain the real value of the capital by buying for 
example land. Further, land holdings are in some countries connected to other privileges such 
as power. The landowner interviewed in this study explained the matter such as “land is 
always land”, i.e. no matter what happens, land will have the same value. Professor Badillo52 
considers it far more profitable to have money in land than in the bank since interest rates are 
low and inflation is significant (about 16 per cent53) in Venezuela. However, he states, 
wealthy Venezuelans hold dollars and inflation is therefore not the whole answer to the idle 
land in Venezuela. Professor Oswaldo Ramos Ojeda54 argues that the reason is the value 
increment on land. But Perkins et al hold on to the inflation theory and claim that in countries 
with high rates of inflation, entrepreneurs and managers spend more time trying to profit from 
inflation and devote therefore less energy to producing more efficiently.55 Badillo maintains 
that the unproductivity is due to the lack of incentives because of a non existing external 
market and exemplifies the beef market as one example where Venezuela is unable to export 
their products to other markets because of sanitary reasons. Tamara Bergkamp56 general 
manager at Venezuela’s Beef Council, also mentions these limitations in the production and 
asserts that they have to be removed before producers actually can increase their production. 
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The State has to focus on regulating these things first, she argues and thereby make the 
production competitive and more efficient. 
Since agricultural production according to the Venezuelan constitution is of social interest, 
latifundias are considered against this interest according to article 307 and are to be 
eliminated. 
5.1.3 Expropriation 
Article 69 in the Law of Land declares that INTi has the right to expropriate private 
agricultural land necessary in order to assure food supply. Article 58 states further that the 
State has the right to expropriate if it is necessary, for social or public reasons, to establish a 
special production, an ecology project or when there is a group of people adapted for 
agricultural work but without, or in possession of very little, land.  
The land of interest will be valued by INTi and there will be a negotiation about the 
compensation. Guido Molina57 (MAT) describes the process as a normal purchase, with the 
State as the buyer. If an agreement cannot be reached, the State can however proceed anyway 
and force the purchase through according to article 76 in the land law. 
The opinions about the expropriation differ, among the people involved in the Law of Land. 
According to Molina58, expropriation of private land works similarly in most countries. If 
land is needed by the State for the nation’s development, security etc. a negotiation is brought 
about and the State buys the land from the landowner. Román Duque Corredor59, Dr in Law, 
though points out that expropriation only should be applied in exceptional cases and article 58 
is very broad, which makes it impossible to know when the State will utilize it. He also 
maintains there ought to be some exceptions because the present situation will create 
uncertainty since landowners never can be sure of their holdings. This will in turn prevent 
them from long-term investments. 
5.1.4 Repossession of land 
One part of the Law of Land is to return State-owned property to the State. This is according 
to Maria Eugenia Cespedes60 at INTi an inventory of the papers the landowners hold, 
necessary because some possessors hold great estates but lack proof of ownership for it all. If 
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the proprietor does not have the appropriate evidence of ownership the State will reclaim the 
land. This is, according to Molina61, not a matter of expropriation since this is land that 
belongs to the State. 
The issue has been debated a lot and the critics maintain the impossibility to know who owns 
the land because a cadastre never has been completed.  
5.1.5 Cooperatives 
The main idea behind the cooperatives is to create collaboration among the peasants in order 
to be more successful. The cooperatives are regulated in a different law and the promotion of 
them is only briefly mentioned in the land law. One example is in article 5 where it is 
declared that agricultural activities such as harvest, transportation etc. should be established 
with codetermination through cooperative or collective organizations. Maria Cespedes62 
claims the State wants to se more unions of peasants because of the many advantages there 
are for groups within the agricultural work in comparison to individuals. One advantage is 
that liquidity rises which makes it possible to pay the cost of capital, which often is high when 
starting agricultural work. To induce people to join cooperatives Cespedes mentions higher 
credits as one carrot. This policy seems to have had effect; Franco Manrique63, who works 
close with the peasants, has seen a big increase in the cooperative area since the promulgation 
of the land law. Duque64 is not surprised since he claims that the State in practice only gives 
land to cooperatives and not to individuals, which he considers to be a limitation because 
working in a cooperative may not suit everyone. In the group of peasants interviewed in the 
rural village Guasdualito in the southwestern parts of Venezuela, several were organized in 
cooperatives. They confirmed a well working system in some areas but explained the 
difficulties in the region of Alto Apure. The most common problem they gave example of was 
coordination difficulties, often related to money, which led to dissolution of cooperatives. 
Domingo Santana65, coordinator of the peasant organisation FNCEZ in Alto Apure, agrees on 
the organisational problems with cooperatives but maintains that they are generally working 
satisfactorily. 
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5.2 Classification of land 
To secure the food production in the country article 115 in the Law of Land contains a 
classification of land related to the potential of different soils. The land in the country is 
classified according to 10 different levels, see figure 9, where the best soils are given low 
numbers and are to be used for food production.66  
If the land is not used 
according to the classification, 
it is, with some exceptions, 
considered idle according to 
article 104 in the law.  
 
The classification system is intended to prevent a bad use of the land in order to raise the 
production of alimentaries. Juan Comerma67, Dr in Agronomy, is conversely of the opinion 
that it is not appropriate to decide specific recommendations for certain soils. This because 
other factors such as culture, infrastructure and the market have to be taken into consideration, 
since they also are likely to influence soil possibilities. Tamara Bergkamp68 continues on the 
same track and remarks on the lack of realism within the law and exemplifies it by a farmer 
producing in an area with bad infrastructure and a very long distance to civilisation. In this 
case, Bergkamp claims, it is irrelevant if the land is classified as type I, because the farmer 
does not have the possibility to transport the goods. Julio Mora Contreras69, ex president of 
IAN, believes that the system will be complicated since the classification system could signify 
that one single farm could have several different soil types. 
5.3 Inactivity taxation 
To prevent a low utilization level of land, article 97 in the Land Law contains an inactivity 
tax, where the tax rate is set by the productivity. Agricultural land, or land with cattle or 
forest, with a productivity rate of more than 80 per cent generates no tax, but if the rate is 
lower, a progressive tax must be paid. The rate of unproductivity also comprises bad use of 
the land and in order to be productive the farmer must use the land according to the 
classification of soils. The lower the productivity is, the higher the tax for the farmer will be.  
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Classes Utilization area   
I, II, III, IV Vegetables 
V Cattle 
VI, VII, VIII Forest 
IX Conservation 
X Agro-tourism 
Figure 9. Land classification system 
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Some are nevertheless excluded from the taxation, among others:70 
1) Proprietors of land covered by natural forest or land not adapted to cultivation because of 
topography or soil quality.  
2) Owners of less than 15 ha land. 
3) Cultivators in a zone that has been affected by natural disasters. 
Julio Mora Contreras71 believes the tax to be the most complicated part of the law because of 
lacking reliable statistics about land in Venezuela. Most producers do not hold registers about 
their production and the lack of an official register makes the issue, according to Mora, very 
complex. Olivier Duque, Carlos Machado and Arnaldo Badillo72 can see the advantages of 
taxation on land but agree on the complexity of the system implemented. Delahaye73 suggests 
the law ought to be a local tax because only on the municipal level it is possible to know the 
soil categories and make it work in reality. Machado and Badillo74 prefer a tax on the size of 
the holding which is a simple system that might decrease the amount of big idle farms. 
The taxation system has not yet been set into effect and will be implemented in 2007. 75 
5.4 The application process 
5.4.1 The Landowner 
The landowner has to apply for a productivity certificate at INTi. If the Institute’s analysis 
shows that the land is not fully productive the owner has 20 days to apply for an improvement 
certification for the farm (certificación de finca mejorable). If no application reaches INTi the 
land could be expropriated or repossessed.76 From the date of certification the applier has a 
period of two years to improve the productivity of the land according to the guidelines of 
INTi77 to finally be able to get the productivity certificate which is valid for two years78. If not 
enough is done to improve the productivity during the two-year period the owner has to pay 
inactivity tax per every unused hectare of land or the land could be expropriated or 
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repossessed by the State.79 A respite of another two years is possible if something 
unpredictable has occurred, that was out of the landowner’s control.80  
5.4.2 The Peasant 
Any Venezuelan citizen might, according to article 35, report knowledge of idle land to a 
regional INTi-office. The land is inspected and the matter is sent to several other instances 
within the Institute to be investigated. This procedure could, according to the INTi-official 
interviewed in the state of Apure, last for years, since INTi has to make clear that the owner 
cannot or does not want to improve the land. The peasants are during the process strictly 
forbidden to use the land since this would be classified as illegal occupation of land. 
It is possible to legally occupy land, but only with an agrarian card (carta agraria). This is a 
proof that the peasant has gone through the administrative process and has access to the land 
and according to Franco Manrique81 it also gives the possibility to receive credits. He 
however remarks that it has nothing to do with the productivity level, but is a certificate of the 
possibility to use the land and only a first step towards a productivity certificate. The 
provisional card is valid for three years and after this period of time INTi decides if a 
productivity certificate could be considered. Delahaye82 however claims that the agrarian 
cards do not have any legal foundation and fears that they never will be transformed into a 
permanent title. This could according to him result in that the peasant might lose the land and 
he mentions Nicaragua as a country where this occurred. Imperfect credit markets, insecure 
property rights and poor access to market opportunity in Nicaragua caused the beneficiaries of 
land reform to sell their land, often at prices well below its productive value.83 
INTi though considers the process before the real certification important since they only want 
serious applicants that truly want to work the land.84 This, especially the access to credit in 
this early stage, has however been very criticized by the opponents to the law and the 
landowner85 from the state of Apure claimed he had seen several cases of farms that have 
been left abandoned after the legal occupation by peasants using the system to get hold of 
credits. 
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5.5 The distribution 
When the peasant has maintained the land effectively in production for three years it is 
possible to receive a permanent title. This title is no real ownership; the land cannot be sold 
and will be owned by the State. According to Molina86 no one is allowed to get land if not a 
far-reaching development plan is established and INTi may also repeal the title if it is not 
handled according to the regulation. However, the peasants have usufruct of the land and their 
descendants may inherit it.87  
5.5.1 Stateowned land 
The fact that the land always will belong to the State has both been supported and criticized 
by the professionals in Venezuela. Carlos Machado88 on the one hand discusses the issue 
about weak property rights and points out that it is difficult to have the necessary long-term 
perspective on agriculture if the State is the owner of the land. Juan Comerma89 on the other 
hand considers the fact that the State now is the owner as an improvement compared to the 
law from 1960, even though he is cautious what this in the long run actually will bring about. 
In the previous law a lot of the redistributed land got back in the hands of the former 
landlords, because of less regulation in this area. Amado Bolívar90, lawyer at INTi, also 
maintains that this is an improvement because in the previous law the land could be used as 
collateral which in several cases resulted in that the ownership was transferred to the bank, 
who sold the land. This caused according to Bolívar the regression back to old structures. 
Mora and Duque91 however claim this prohibition to sell land will make it impossible for 
banks to lend peasants money, which will prevent the economy from developing.  
The possibility to inherit the land most consider as a good idea since this creates stability and 
incentives to long-term investments. According to Badillo92 the areas distributed though are 
too small to be helpful for the next generation. Five or ten hectares inherited by five children 
give negligible areas useless for production, he claims. 
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5.5.2 Informal market 
Because of the prohibition against purchase of distributed land some people fear a 
development of a black market of land. This could happen if the peasant’s Willingness To 
Accept (WTA) after the distribution is lower than the buyer’s Willingness To Pay (WTP), i.e. 
WTAseller < WTPbuyer. If an illegal market is to come about the buyer however has to consider 
a risk of losing the land on an illegal market but if the the risk is considered and the WTPbuyer 
still transcend the peasant’s WTA the transaction may occur on an informal market. 
This is said to have been the case in the Law of Agrarian Reform from 1960 and Delahaye 
asserts that during the former law, the land market in Venezuela had two faces, one formal 
and one informal and that the informal and illegal part probably was essential.93 Bolívar94 at 
INTi regards the development of a black land market today as a possibility but states that the 
people involved will not benefit from it because the documents have to have authorization by 
INTi or else they are illegal and worthless. Guido Molina95 at MAT states that the creation of 
a black market is not probable since they now are aware of the problem and Maria 
Cespedes96, INTi, claims that there is more control now than previously. Since the title is 
drawn on the person that receives the land and that actualisations are done currently, she 
considers it hard for an informal market to survive. Delahaye97 however maintains that even 
after the promulgation of the new law, an informal land market exists and takes corruption as 
one main factor of its existence. He therefore considers it impossible to eliminate this market 
by control and believes the only way to solve the problem is through a legalization of 
purchase. Against this speaks that the land then might return to the owners of large estates and 
therefore counteract its purpose but Delahaye comments that this might not be the case. He as 
well as Mora98 claim that studies have shown that it is not the largest farmers that have 
benefited from the 40 years of agrarian reform but the medium owners. The small farmers, 
that were the object of the reform, however have remained in the same situation as before. 
Delahaye considers this as a proof that prohibition to sell does not favour small farmers, an 
extensive illegal market has though not benefited owners of large estates either, and he 
therefore sees the possibility of a successful legalization. 
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5.5.1 Support to the peasants 
The Venezuelan constitution article 306 declares that the State should stimulate the 
agricultural activity by providing infrastructure, credits, further education and technical 
assistance.99 Franco Manrique100, who is working closely with peasants, describes this as a 
huge improvement of the agrarian reform since according to him the possibilities for peasants 
to obtain credit in the previous law were very limited. The financial help is to be used on land 
and machinery, but could occasionally be given for the construction of houses, he asserts. He 
continues that the money received is either a loan with low interest rate or sometimes a 
subsidy, and that credits are followed up by education. According to Cespedes101 cash-
payment is given very limited, and only together with a detailed presentation of the project. 
Support is given for seeds and crops but most commonly as machinery because of 
international agreements with for example China to deliver tractors. Mora102 though opposes 
this method and insists this was something they tried in the former law and he has witnessed 
the consequences with rusted tractors standing still because the battery is finished or 
something minor is broken. Machado103 believes that the credit system from the State is going 
to bring the peasants into a vicious circle of poverty. Based on experience he does not think 
the peasants will be able to repay the loans to the State and he considers that a system cannot 
be built out of gifts, it has to be built on incentives and willingness to progress. He claims this 
help to the peasants only will be temporary and it will likely vanish when the oil price goes 
down and the peasants will then sink even deeper into poverty. Delahaye104 agrees and argues 
that this form of clientelism has to be brought to an end in order to help the peasants to long-
term progress. The INTi-official in Apure however claims the opposite to be the problem and 
states that in his region the help has not yet reached the peasants and only established farmers 
have received credits, mostly for tractors and cattle.  
6 Analysis and Discussion 
This chapter aims to address the questions stated in chapter one, based on the theoretical 
framework and the empirical data. I will analyse and link the two areas together, to determine 
the economic potential of the agrarian reform in Venezuela. 
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6.1 Efficiency 
As stated in chapter three it is relevant to evaluate efficiency, when discussing economic 
perspectives. Relevant in the argumentation is the efficiency of the reallocation of resources 
that will take place as a result of the law. Further an analysis of the importance of the farmsize 
in an efficiency perspective as well as the taxation system will be discussed in this section. 
6.1.1 Reallocation of resources 
Land for distribution is to be taken from stateowned land, including the repossessed land, but 
also, if necessary from expropriated land. Whether an efficiency gain will take place in 
Venezuela depends among other things on the compensation to the landowners in the case of 
expropriation. Since I discuss this law from a theoretical standpoint, the repossessions are 
merely state-owned land I will not discuss this separately. I am aware of the discussion going 
on in Venezuela about the fairness of these repossessions and that some argue that the State is 
actually stealing land, but this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
To determine if the reallocation of resources as a result of the agrarian reform in Venezuela is 
efficient, some additional information is needed and I will have to make some assumptions in 
order to discuss the matter. To pass the Kaldor-Hicks’ compensation test the winner must be 
able to compensate the loser, at least theoretically, and still be better off. In the case of 
expropriation three assumptions can be made: (1) If the compensation is, or could be, taken 
from funds that mainly were meant for peasants, (2) if the amount corresponds to the market 
value and (3) if the peasant’s quality of life is improved, the reallocation could be efficient 
according to Kaldor-Hicks’ compensation test. In the Venezuelan land reform this is not the 
case, since the money used to compensate the landowners is taken from the government and 
would probably also benefit landowners in the case of no land reform. Simplified it may be 
explain as the landowners therefore are compensated partly with their own money which 
would mean they had to be given more than the market value if the arrangement is to pass the 
compensation test. This extra amount would have to be taken from the peasants, at least in 
theory, which might be hard in the Venezuelan case. Well functioning credit institutions 
would however improve the chances of an efficient outcome according to the Kaldor-Hicks’ 
test. An agrarian reform could however pass an efficiency test if a diminishing marginal 
utility of income is considered. The efficiency level and the contribution to society welfare 
will then depend on how big the improvement in life quality is for the peasants as well as how 
small the change is for the landlords and hence how great the curvature in figure 2 in chapter 
  
27 
 
 
three is. These two factors are difficult to measure empirically. Some that are working close 
with peasants such as Franco Manrique105 however claim that there has been an upgrading in 
the quality of life among the peasants that have received land in the Venezuelan reform. He 
adds however that a lot of other factors matters, such as water and seed access, in order to 
improve life substantially. Manrique has seen a change in these areas as well, but some fields 
have been neglected which has prevented an even greater improvement.  
6.1.2 Farm size 
Small farms are according to some literature said to have efficiency advantages when it comes 
to growing most crops. These findings are rather controversial since large scale production 
normally is associated with economies of scale. Delahaye however confirms that small farms 
seems to have this advantage also in Venezuela, where in 1971 more than half of the 
production came from small and medium farmers although this group only occupied 7.58 per 
cent of the agricultural area exploited.106 Even though the statistics may seem old, these things 
do not change rapidly and can still give an indication of the situation. The question is however 
why large proprietors proportionally don’t produce as much as small producers. In the case of 
Venezuela I question if the problem is low efficiency and not the fact that holders of large 
estates do not produce at all or only produce on parts of their holdings. It may depend on lack 
of incentives or reluctance because they are not obligated to do so in order to enrich 
themselves, but whatever the reason is, this has to be changed for the production to rise. If 
low production is considered a problem one way of adjusting it could be to eliminate great 
estates, let small and medium sized farms dominate and thereby reach more production. This 
argument would speak for that the Law of Land in this sense could be regarded defensible 
from an economic perspective. This is though not the only way to solve the problem and 
another possibility could be to raise the incentives for large farmers so that they produce 
more.  
Apart from the efficiency part, small farms are also considered to be more labour intensive 
than large farms, which is not a controversial argument since large farms instead usually are 
more capital intensive. The use of more labour might in an industrialized country be 
considered inefficient, since labour is one of the most expensive parts in the manufacturing 
process. In developing countries, like Venezuela, labour is however inexpensive and can be 
used to a great extent. This would besides generate employment in the countryside. Essential 
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to remark is however the importance to keep large existing farms that are efficient. For 
instance could be noticed that bananas and sugarcane are crops of some importance in 
Venezuela and the advantages of large farms when it comes to these crops should not be 
neglected. 
A challenging factor that might prevent efficiency gains in the case of a distribution of land 
could be the increased responsibility that will face the peasants afterwards. Valdes writes that 
some smallholders may never have the capacity to adjust to the demands of a modern 
competitive agriculture.107 This increased responsibility must be carefully followed up by 
education about how to handle the new situation. King mentions that landless labourers 
cannot be turned into efficient owner-farmers overnight108 and it will probably take time for a 
production increase to come.  
One way to solve the problem with increasing responsibility could be cooperation. The 
increasing amount of cooperatives in Venezuela could be effective for the society because 
transaction costs could decrease. Adams claims that working with groups is one way to 
reduce transaction costs, since the costs are less if the intermediary makes one relatively large 
loan to a group of individuals rather a number of smaller loans to individuals.109 However a 
lot of information and education about this system has to be delivered to the peasants in order 
to create stable cooperatives. 
6.1.3 Land taxation 
Governmental interventions might reduce problems such as external costs but they frequently 
bring negative consequences. Since land supply however is inelastic, land taxation might be a 
preferable way to achieve production since it will not result in dead weight losses. Besides it 
induces the owner to sell off unutilized land since the price of owning land has increased. 
According to the theory about land taxes referred to in chapter three above, the Venezuelan 
tax system might also in other ways be efficient from an economic perspective. 
The tax system integrated in the Law of Land is a progressive tax that punishes low 
production and gives incentives to raise the production above the taxation limit. It excludes 
small farms from taxation, which gives lower administrative costs and less risk for poor 
farmers. It also has a classification system that eliminates injustice when it comes to land 
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qualities. Major problems are still that a cadastre never has been done properly which might 
make the taxation system very complicated, as well as the ambiguities that the law might 
contain when it comes to the definitions. Since the taxation system yet is in the future the 
question is how the Venezuelan authorities will apply the law. In the case of ambiguities, this 
will create insecurity, which probably would lead to less efficiency and less investments, and 
if an official register is not complete the taxing system will be unjust or only work partly. 
6.2 Investments 
Investments are essential for an economy to develop and a favourable environment for 
investments include well defined property rights but also credit possibilities for investors. 
6.2.1 Property rights 
Secured property rights are important in order to reach efficiency and above all the long-term 
investments that are needed in agriculture. This issue is difficult to estimate in the Venezuelan 
case and the question is whether investments will increase because of secured property rights 
for the peasants or decrease because of the insecurity that large landowners experience. 
Against an increase indicates the ambiguities in the law and the future will tell how easy it is, 
in reality, to expropriate land. Important to keep in mind is that the expropriation for social or 
public reasons in article 58 in the law itself is not anything extraordinary but present in most 
laws, including the Swedish. In the Swedish constitution chapter two is stated in 18 § that 
property is protected from expropriation except when it is required in order to consider public 
interests. The issue is thus again the interpretation of the law, and more insecurity, banks that 
refuse to give credits and fewer investments made by landowners would be the result of an 
application of the law where it is unproblematic to expropriate land. Another issue is the fact 
that the peasant will not own the land after the distribution and whether this will give the 
security required to invest, since a change in the political sphere could lead to new huge 
structural modifications. Assumed this would create caution in the willingness to invest 
among the peasants as well, we would be in a situation where neither the security-induced-
investment-effect (more is invested because of security) nor the collateral-based-credit-
supply-effect (where banks are keener on giving credits) would apply. 
6.2.2 Credits 
For increased investment indicates that bigger areas after the distribution can be cultivated 
and people who before were excluded from the land and credit market now can get the 
possibility to actually make investments, which might be highly profitable for the society as a 
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whole. If seen from this point of view, a distribution of land and the State as a creditor only is 
a torsion of a distorted market, back to the point where it is supposed to be. That is, if land 
markets did not work adequately before because peasants due to credit constraints did not 
have the option either to get land or to invest in agricultural production the market is put right 
by this agrarian reform. According to my opinion there is no difference between the State as 
lender and private banks and if the credit process works satisfactory, which is essential for the 
whole project, I do not see a large risk in the fact that the State owns the land. Even though 
the peasants will not own the land they will be the ones receiving the benefit from their work, 
which should increase the willingness to invest.  
6.2.3 Industry and agriculture 
An increased agricultural sector might besides result in investments in other areas in the 
society besides rural regions. Mora110 mentions that industry, factories and services could 
have production connected to agriculture and create employment and possibilities for 
Venezuela. Hence Venezuela does not only have to concentrate on the primary production but 
on refinement of the products produced and thereby combine their rural potential with urban 
modern technology. Venezuela could find a niche in another area than the oil business where 
they also might be competitive on a global market. One problem with this argumentation is 
the Dutch Desease. If this mechanism still is a fact it will be difficult for Venezuela to 
compete on the world market because of the high prices. If the products cannot reach the 
international market, big subsidies from the State are necessary to keep up the production and 
this requires fiscal income to the state. Income taxes might be one way to solve the problem 
but this requires a good organisation. A deeper analysis of this matter is however outside the 
scope of this paper. 
6.3 Inequality 
Since the distribution of stateowned land and the fact that the compensation to the landlords is 
financed through governmental funds, the land reform in Venezuela partly reduces inequality 
in the society and makes the peasant’s income share rise. How large the reduction is and how 
big a rise depends on the share of money from the state to the peasants in the case of no land 
reform. A larger share would mean less reduction of inequality in the case of land reform, i.e. 
a land reform would change the prevailing situation less. 
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However it is possible to question the importance of a reduction in inequality in a country like 
Venezuela with such small agricultural sector. An important question to bring forward is 
whether or not other reforms might be more cost effective in order to reach the purpose of 
equality, but this argumentation will not be further developed in this paper. 
Another factor that reduces inequality is the repossession of land taking place in the country, 
since in all probability it is an investigation of large holdings. This investigation is necessary 
in order to get essential knowledge about the country’s land but a very difficult project that 
could be a threat against the property right, but, as mentioned before, this discussion is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
One factor that might prevent equalization, or at least make it less important, is the 
development of an illegal market of land. According to my opinion the risk for this is 
considerable if the credit system does not work. To prevent an illegal market, the peasants’ 
Willingness To Accept (WTA) has to increase, i.e. increase the value of land for them. To 
realize this, the State’s credit system has to work adequately to give incentives for the 
peasants to invest. This has to be linked together with education that gives understanding for 
long-term solutions. Both these areas are included in the law text and hopefully the 
widespread corruption in Venezuela will not prevent them from being implemented. 
7 Conclusions 
The last chapter of this study intends to address the research question stated in chapter one. 
My aim was to investigate whether the agrarian reform in Venezuela could be defensible from 
an economic perspective and my findings are summarized below. Because of its complexity, 
the question cannot be answered just by a yes or a no, however some conclusions can be 
made.  
The land reform taking place in Venezuela is not efficient according to traditional economic 
efficiency theories, such as Pareto and probably not according to Kaldor-Hicks’ compensation 
test either. It can however be efficient if a diminishing marginal utility model is considered, 
on condition that the outcome of the reform gives a substantial increase in the peasants’ life 
quality. The efficiency level depends however on the preferences of the people involved 
(peasants and landlords) and their utility of income. 
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The indication of a greater productivity when it comes to small farms is uncertain, but small 
farms might after all be more preferable in a developing country such as Venezuela because 
of the use of more labour. The reform could therefore possibly be defensible from this point 
of view but added must be that these findings are quite uncertain and other methods might be 
more favourable in order to reach a higher employment rate and more efficient farms.  
Moreover the reform could be economically favourable when it comes to land taxes. When 
external effects are present a governmental intervention could solve the problem and if low 
production is seen as a negative external effect a tax on improductive land might remedy this. 
The system introduced in Venezuela seems to, in broad outlines, correspond to economic 
theory about how a land tax should be designed. The system could however under the 
prevailing circumstances in Venezuela be too complicated and the future has to show whether 
that is the case. 
When it comes to investments two different directions could be expected as a result of the 
Land Law. One is more investments because of a higher rate of security for the peasants and 
the other is lower investments because of insecurity for the farmers. The interpretation of the 
law will have a major influence on which direction will be the dominating. Improved 
productivity can only be reached if the peasants receive help on other areas after receiving 
land. Infrastructure for transportation of goods, water for irrigation but also a working health 
care and educational system are of importance. Education for the peasants so they can handle 
the new situation is also essential and if the government does not provide this support we will 
probably never see a living countryside in Venezuela, but rather less investments, since large 
companies do not have the security to invest in long-term projects. 
The reform will probably partly reduce inequalities in the society which could be favourable 
for the economy. One major factor influencing the issue is however the corruption in 
Venezuela and the question is how the government manages to fight this matter. 
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Personal messages in Venezuela 
Badillo, Arnaldo 
Ex vice Minster of Agriculture 1998, retired professor of the faculty of Agronomy, 
institution of Economics. Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Personal meeting 2005-11-25
 
Bergkamp Sierman, Tamara 
General manager of Consejo Venezolano de la Carne (Convecar), Venezuela’s Beef  
Council, Caracas 
Personal meeting 2005-11-21
 
 
Bolívar, Armado 
Doctor in Law, lawyer at INTi (Instituto Nacional de Tierra), Caracas 
Personal meeting 2005-11-09
 
 
Cespedes, Maria 
Professor, Land specialist at INTi (Instituto Nacional de Tierras) oficina tecnica 
Agraria, Caracas. 
Personal meeting 2005-11-09
 
 
Comerma, Juan 
Doctor in Agronomy. Works with rural issues at PEQUIVEN. Worked earlier with 
soils and land-valuation for the Agrarian Land Institute and at Universidad Central 
de Venezuela. 
Personal meeting 2005-12-11
 
 
Delahaye, Olivier 
Professor, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Faculty of Agriculture, Institution of 
Economy, Maracay. 
Personal meeting 2005-12-12 
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Duque Corredor, Román 
Doctor in Law, joint owner of the lawyer's office Hoet Pelaez Castillo y Duque. Ex 
member of the Supreme Court, ex professor at Universidad Catolico and University 
Central de Venezuela, coordinator of courses in agrarian and environmental law at 
Universidad Ezequiel Zamora de Barinas and member of the American law 
committee and the institute of Iberoamerican agrarian law and agrarian reform. 
Personal meeting 2005-11-18
 
 
 
Machado Allison, Carlos 
Doctor in ecology and genetics, professor of IESA (Instituto de Estudios Superiores 
de Administración) Caracas, ex professor at UCV (Universidad Central de 
Venezuela), academical coordinator of the program of Agrobusiness. 
Personal meeting 2005-11-18
 
 
Manrique, Franco 
Agronomist, Member of Comité de Tierras Urbanas (the urban land committee) an 
organization that supports the peasants. 
Personal meeting 2005-11-10 
 
Miranda, Noel 
Geologist at INTi (Instituto Nacional de Tierra), Caracas 
Personal meeting 2005-11-09 
 
Molina, Guido 
Official at Ministerio de Agricultura y Tierra (Ministry of Agriculture and Land), 
Mérida. 
Personal meeting 2005-10-13 
 
Mora Contreras, Julio 
Ex. President of IAN (National Agrarian Institute), Professor at the Faculty of 
Agronomy Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Personal meeting 2005-12-12
 
 
Ramos Ojeda, Oswaldo 
Retired professor at FACES (Faculty of Economics), Universidad de Los Andes 
(ULA), Merida. 
Personal meeting 2005-10-22 
 
Santana, Domingo 
Coordinator of the peasant organisation FNCEZ (Frente Nacional Campesina 
Esquiel Zamora), Guasdualito, Alto Apure. 
Personal meeting 2005-10-17 
 
Group of seven peasants involved in the peasant organisation FNCEZ (Frente Nacional 
Campesina Esquiel Zamora), Guasdualito, Alto Apure. 
Personal meeting 2005-10-17 
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INTi official in the technical area. Regional INTi-office, small town in the state of Apure 
Personal meeting 2005-10-17  
 
Male landowner of about 200 ha land, ca 50 years old. State of Apure. 
Personal meeting 2005-10-15 
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Appendix 
Original text 
1) Articulo 306, Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. 
 
Igualemente fomentará la actividad agricola y el uso óptimo de la tierra mediante la dotación 
de las obras de infrastructura, insumos, créditos, servicios de capacitación y asistencia 
técnica.” 
2) Tierras de Reforma Agraria – origenes, conceptos y trámites para su adjudicación 
”La transformación de la estructura agraria del país y la incorporación de su población rural al 
desarrollo económico, social y político de la nación, mediante la sustitución del sistema 
latifundista por un sistema justo de propiedad, tenencia y explotación de la tierra, basado en la 
equitativa distribucion de la misma, la adecuada organización del crédito y la asistencia 
integral para los productores del campo” 
3) Articulo 306, Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela 
”El Estado promoverá las condiciónes para el desarrollo rural integral, con el propósito de 
generar empleo y garantizar a la población campesina un nivel adecuado de bienestar” 
4) Artículo 7, La Ley de Tierras y Desarollo Agrario 
“Se determinará la existencia de un latifundio, cuando señalada su vocación de uso, así como 
su extensión territorial, se evidencie un rendimiento idóneo menor a 80%” 
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